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ABSTRACT IDEAS: THE TIME HAS COME FOR CONGRESS 
TO ADDRESS THE PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE AND 
BUSINESS METHOD INVENTIONS 
TANNER MORT 
ABSTRACT 
What is an abstract idea? Is it merely an idea that cannot exist in 
concrete form? Or is there more to it? The term “abstract” is generally 
defined as “existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical 
or concrete existence.” If this is the correct definition, then how can 
something physical be abstract? For almost five years now, the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the courts, and even 
some of the most experienced patent practitioners have wrestled with 
this question. 
On June 19, 2014, the United States Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, significantly curtailing 
the issuance of software and business method patents during the 
midst of the world-wide Digital Revolution. What was considered a 
narrow issue before the Court, unexpectedly turned into what most 
scholars might consider to be the most disruptive Supreme Court 
decision regarding subject-matter eligibility in the history of the U.S. 
patent laws. 
On certification before the Court was the issue of whether a generic-
computer implementation of using a third-party intermediary to 
mitigate settlement risk was a patent-eligible invention, or instead a 
patent-ineligible abstract idea. In answering this question 
affirmatively as to the latter, the Court seemingly moved closer to 
putting an end to the issuance of software and business method 
patents. To make matters even worse, the Court was reluctant to offer 
much guidance for determining whether different patents and patent 
applications claiming similar subject-matter were still patent-eligible.  
Since the Alice decision, however, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, in addition to the USPTO, have found ways to 
slowly revive the issuance of such patents, as well as provide some 
clarity as to what constitutes a patent-ineligible abstract idea. In 
addition, members of Congress have proposed solutions to the 
problem in the form of amending 35 U.S.C. § 101; however, getting 
members of Congress to back amendments to the patent law has 
proven to be another challenge. Thus, in light of these circumstances, 
including the fact that the United States is moving into the fourth 
phase of the Digital Revolution, this paper discusses why 
Congressional action is needed to determine just what type of 
inventions are patent eligible so as to “Promote the Progress of Science 
and the Useful Arts” as mandated by the United States Constitution.  
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“No organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to 
every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can 
anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain express provisions for 
all possible questions.” – Abraham Lincoln 
I. A BOOK WITH NO PICTURES: AN INTRODUCTION AND ROADMAP 
Beginning with the invention of the transistor1 in 1947, and followed shortly 
by the first computer in 1951, the Digital Revolution has caused the United States 
 
 
1. Transistors, more simply put, “are tiny switches that can be triggered by electric signals[;] [t]hey 
are the basic building blocks of microchips” used in today’s digital electronic devices. Robert Coolman, 
What is a Transistor?, LIVE SCIENCE (May 31, 2014), https://www.livescience.com/46021-what-is-a-
transistor.html.  
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of America to undergo “one of the most significant and radical societal, cultural, 
and economic revolutions of its short history—quite possibly of all human history.”2 
However, innovation did not end with the invention of the computer; instead, it 
was just the beginning. Over the next several decades, computers changed from 
expensive, room-sized appliances that were available for only the biggest 
enterprises, into universal, household commodities.3 In 1994, the world was 
introduced to the first ever smartphone that would eventually lead to Apple’s 
development of the iPhone in 2007, exploding the usage of smartphones and 
changing the lives of many Americans by giving them the ability to stay connected 
with friends and family like never before.4 And just when the technology seemed 
too good to be true, cars started driving themselves in 2012, or at least with the 
assistance of a computer, that is.5 
Other than possibly your cranky grandfather and his buddies who just prefer 
the “good-old days,” most Americans would likely agree that the Digital Revolution 
has made life easier in many aspects. For instance, rather than sending a letter in 
the mail, or trying to reach a friend on her land-line telephone, email and the 
widespread usage of cell phones have made communicating with others easier than 
ever before. Additionally, innovation stemming from the Digital Revolution has 
enabled almost anything to be performed on or assisted by a computer. As an 
example, many Americans can now file their tax returns on a computer, as well as 
submit their return electronically over the internet to the IRS. The IRS may then 
directly deposit or “wire” an individual’s tax refund into his or her bank account 
without ever sending a check in the mail.  
To put it in another context, the Digital Revolution has created opportunities 
for programmers to engineer ways to enable a computer to assist in various routine 
processes. Some of these processes can be as simple as filing your tax return, as in 
the above example. Thus, the challenge that has been created is how do we help 
these programmers protect their innovations?  
The patent laws of the United States were designed to encourage innovation 
by rewarding inventors with a limited time monopoly in exchange for the disclosure 
of their new invention.6 One of the requirements for obtaining a patent, however, 
is that an invention be new or “novel.”7 Thus, inventors claiming entitlement to a 
patent for a software or business method innovation may commonly be denied 
such a grant, as the only thing the inventor may have accomplished is to implement 
 
 
2. Anurag Harsh, The Digital Revolution and its Impact on Industry, Consumers, and Government, 
HUFFPOST (Aug. 11, 2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-digital-revolution-and-
its-impact-on-industry-consumers_us_57acdc9de4b0ae60ff020c2d. 
3. Id. 
4. See A Brief History of the Digital Revolution, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY FACILITIES COUNCIL, 
https://stfc.ukri.org/files/digital-revolution-infographic/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
5. Id. 
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; JOHN M. GOLDEN, F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, & HENRY E. SMITH, 
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 35–40 (7th ed. 2018). 
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2018). 
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a well-known practice that is “long prevalent in our system of commerce” on a 
computer.8 Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, this type of invention has 
come to be known as an unpatentable “abstract idea” that is not in compliance with 
35 U.S.C. § 101,9  even though “novelty” is determined under 35 U.S.C. § 102.10 The 
problem that seems to have arisen in the United States courts and the patent office, 
however, is determining what exactly constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea.  
Because many scholars and economists believe we are now heading into the 
“fourth wave” of the Digital Revolution,11 it is paramount that Congress clear the 
air, once and for all, as to what type of inventions are eligible to receive a United 
States patent within the software and business method art fields. That is the focus 
of this paper. First, this paper explores the history and origins of the abstract idea 
exception to patent subject-matter eligibility. Next will follow an examination of 
recent Supreme Court precedent on the abstract idea exception during the early 
progression of the Digital Revolution, followed by a recap of the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International. The paper then 
surveys post-Alice statistics in e-commerce and computer-related art units in the 
USPTO, in addition to discussing the current struggles of the U.S. patent system in 
these related fields. The paper concludes with a discussion of the current state of 
the law for patentable subject-matter followed by a model amendment to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101. 
II. DOWN THE RABBIT-HOLE: SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND THE 
ABSTRACT IDEA EXCEPTION 
The Progress Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the 
exclusive power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”12 Under this grant of power, Congress passed the Patent 
Act of 1790, made clarifications and simplified the U.S. patent system in the Patent 
Act of 1952, and—most recently—made significant changes to the patent laws in 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011.13 In addition to these changes, 
Congress has made minor amendments to the patent laws from time to time in 
 
 
8. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 219–20 (2014) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593, 611 (2010)). 
9. See id. at 218. 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). In fact, many advocates argue that the United States patent system 
should substantially limit the abstract idea exception of § 101 altogether, reasoning that recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has disturbed the once-bright line between section 101 patent-eligibility analysis 
and sections 102, 103, and 112 patentability analysis. See, e.g., Kevin A. Rieffel, What is Director Iancu 
Proposing the USPTO do for §101 Analysis?, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 25, 2018) (emphasis added), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/25/director-iancu-proposing-uspto-§101-analysis/id=101682/.  
11. Harsh, supra note 2; see also John Zysman & Martin Kenney, The Next Phase in the Digital 
Revolution: Intelligent Tools, Platforms, Growth, Employment, 61 COMM. ACM 54, 55 (2018) (discussing 
how the fourth (current) phase of the Digital Revolution is characterized by “cloud computing facilitated 
by the increasing abundance of inexpensive computational power, storage, and transmission 
resources.”). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13. See A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY (May 7, 2014), 
https://ladas.com/education-center/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the-united-states-2/. 
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order to “harmonize our patent laws with those of other countries and to address 
transborder activity that affects the commercial value of U.S. patents.”14  
 What constitutes patentable subject-matter is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
which states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”15 Section 101 is 
commonly referred to as the gatekeeper for patentability,16 asking the threshold 
question of whether the “inventions claimed [are] of a kind contemplated by 
Congress as possibly patentable if they turn out to be new, useful, and unobvious 
within the meaning of those terms as used in the statute.”17 Additionally, § 101 is 
considered to be a “dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen 
inventions,”18 and the operative language of § 101, except for one word,19 has never 
been amended since 1793—three years after the original Patent Act of 1790.20 
Despite this, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that § 101 contains 
an important, implicit exception: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas are not patentable.21  
The Court’s reasoning for these three judicial exceptions is that laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”22 Thus, granting a patent that would enable the 
monopolization of such principals may place an impediment on innovation rather 
than promoting it, thereby frustrating the main objective that the patent laws were 
designed to promote: the progress of science and the useful arts.23 For instance, 
the exception pertaining to laws of nature would have prevented Isaac Newton 
from obtaining a patent for discovering the law of gravity.24 Likewise, the natural 
phenomena exception would bar a discoverer of a new plant found in the wild from 
 
 
14. LYDIA P. LOREN & JOSEPH S. MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 124 (6th ed. 
2018). 
15. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
16. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, The Gatekeeping Function of Patent Eligibility as Part of a More 
Complete Understanding of § 101 Principles, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 24, 2016), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/wexler-gatekeeping-eligibility.html.  
17. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 963–64 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich, J.) (emphasis in original). 
18. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001). 
19. See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 14, at 165. In the Patent Act of 1952, the word “art” was traded 
for the word “process.” Id. 
20. Id. at 124. 
21. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (naturally 
occurring DNA is product of nature and not patent eligible but cDNA is not naturally occurring and 
therefore patent eligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) 
(patent invalid because claimed underlying laws of nature); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (held 
applicants’ method was an unpatentable abstract idea); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, (1981) (process 
which employed mathematical equation still patentable because do not seek to pre-empt use of 
equation itself but the process); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (human-made micro-
organism is patentable). 
22. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
23. Cf. Id. 
24. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
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obtaining a patent.25 However, there is simply no easy example to describe the 
Court’s most hotly-debated judicial exception to patentability: abstract ideas. 
So why do we not know what constitutes an abstract idea? Surely there must 
be a definition for “abstract idea” buried somewhere in prior Supreme Court 
opinions. After all, the abstract idea exception has “deep roots” in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, dating as far back as the 19th century.26 The exception first seemed 
to appear, at least in the Supreme Court,27 during its December term of 1852 in the 
case of Le Roy v. Tatham.28 In that case, the Court stated that an abstract principle 
is one that is “considered apart from any special purpose or practical operation;”29 
it is “a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive.”30 Although this notion of 
abstract principles first appeared in the 1850s, the Supreme Court did not seem to 
revisit using the term “abstract” itself for over a hundred years.31 In fact, it was not 
until 1972 when the “abstract idea” exception to patentability finally reappeared 
before the Supreme Court in the case of Gottschalk v. Benson,32 which will be 
discussed in further detail below. Since Benson, however, the abstract idea 
exception has arisen much more frequently in Supreme Court cases concerning 
issues of patent subject-matter eligibility, where it has become common practice 
for the Court to regularly state that abstract ideas are one of the three judicial 
exceptions to patentability.33 
Despite this extensive history, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to offer 
modernized analysis tools for determining whether a specific patent claim is 
directed to an abstract idea.34 And while the Court originally defined an abstract 
idea as “a fundamental truth; an original cause; [or] a motive,”35 the technological 




26. MPEP § 2106.04(a) (9th ed. rev. Jan. 2018); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–602 
(2010) (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–175 (1853)). 
27. The judicial exception against claiming abstract ideas dates as far back as 1840 when 
considering cases that never reached the Supreme Court; the earliest of these cases was Wyeth v. Stone. 
See 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107).  In Wyeth, the patent specification described an 
apparatus for cutting ice, as well as a multi-step process for using the apparatus to cut ice. Id. at 725. 
The patent further had two claims, with one claim directed to the “apparatus and machinery to cut ice, 
described in the specification,” and the other claim directed to “an exclusive title to the art of cutting ice 
by means of any power, other than human power.” Id. at 727. Justice Story, riding circuit, ruled the 
second claim to be “utterly unmaintainable,” because it was “a claim for an art or principle in the 
abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery, by which ice is to be cut. No man can have a 
right to cut ice by all means and methods.” Id. (emphasis added). 
28. See Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 176. 
29. Id. at 185. 
30. Id. at 175. 
31. Cf. id.; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
32. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67–68. 
33. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
34. MPEP § 2106.04(a) (9th ed. rev. Jan. 2018) (citing Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 
841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d. 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“Despite this long history, the courts have declined to define abstract ideas.”). 
35. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
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unhelpful.36 In Benson itself, the Court stated that “[t]he technological problems 
tendered . . . before us indicate to us that considered action by the Congress is 
needed.”37  
Although these technological problems with the abstract idea exception have 
been known for more than 40 years,38 in the absence of clear guidance from the 
Supreme Court, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the 
federal courts have been left to determine whether patent claims are directed to 
an abstract idea by referring to earlier court precedent and comparing a claimed 
concept to concepts previously identified as ineligible by the courts.39 In other 
words, a sort of “patentability by analogy” analytical approach has developed. 
Additionally, the unavailability of modernized analysis tools has led to uncertainty 
in the field as to the future validity of software and business method patents 
because all inventions, at least at some level, “embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply . . . abstract ideas.”40 Indeed, the Director of the USPTO, Andrei Iancu, has 
advocated that the current state of the law regarding whether an invention is truly 
a patent ineligible abstract idea “confound[s] the most sophisticated practitioners 
in our patent system . . . [because] people simply don’t know how to draw these 
distinctions.”41 
III. A LONG TALE WITH A KNOT: SCOTUS PRECEDENT ON ABSTRACT IDEAS 
As noted above, the judicial exception that abstract ideas are not patent 
eligible first arose in 1852 in the case of Le Roy v. Tatham.42 Although the abstract 
idea exception had not fully shown its face in the Supreme Court all that often—if 
at all—since the time of its first introduction,43 the Digital Revolution seemingly 
opened the door for the judicial exception to act as a catch-all for software and 
business method patents. 
The first Supreme Court case of the Twentieth Century that featured the 
abstract idea exception as applied to a software-related invention was Gottschalk 
v. Benson.44 There, the Court considered patent claims directed to a method of 
converting “binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals” with 
 
 
36. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7, 2019) 
(discussing how it has been difficult for courts and practitioners to classify subject-matter as abstract or 
non-abstract, and how similar subject-matter has been classified as abstract in some cases and non-
abstract in other cases). 
37. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).  
38. See id. at 63.  
39. MPEP § 2106.04(a) (9th ed. rev. Jan. 2018). 
40. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012). 
41. Kevin E. Noonan, Director Iancu Produces Glimmer of Patent Eligibility Hope, JD SUPRA (Sept. 
25, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/director-iancu-produces-glimmer-of-36294/.  
42. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
43. Id.; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
44. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67–68.  
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the aid of a computer.45 Although the claimed method varied the steps of the 
ordinary arithmetic procedure for converting BCD to pure binary, the method was 
not limited to any particular art, technology, machinery, or end use.46 The 
mathematical procedures embodied by the claims could be carried out by “existing 
computers long in use” with no additional or new machinery necessary; the 
procedures could even be performed without a computer.47 After reasoning that 
the algorithm embodied by the claims had no “practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer” and, as such, would in effect be “a patent on 
the algorithm itself,” the Court held the patent invalid.48 
The next case considered by the Court featuring the abstract idea exception 
came just a few years later.49 In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered claims for a 
method of calculating and updating an “alarm limit”—a number used during 
catalytic conversion processes to determine whether an abnormal operating 
condition is present.50 The claimed method at issue comprised essentially three 
steps: (1) measuring “the present value of a process variable”; (2) using an 
“algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value”; and (3) updating the actual 
alarm-limit to the calculated alarm-limit value.51 Since the claims embodied a 
mathematical algorithm, the Court noted that for the invention to pass the abstract 
idea threshold, the “process itself, [and] not merely the mathematical algorithm, 
must be new and useful.”52 Applying this test, the Court reasoned that the only 
thing novel in the claims was the algorithm itself, and thus held that the claims, 
“considered as a whole, [contained] no patentable invention.”53 
A short three years later, however, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court upheld 
allegedly abstract patent claims for a computer assisted method of curing rubber.54 
The claims at issue in Diehr recited steps for curing rubber in a mold, wherein the 
temperature inside of the mold was constantly monitored and fed into a 
computer.55 The computer would then repeatedly recalculate the cure time using 
the “Arrhenius equation” and, when the recalculated time equaled the elapsed 
time, the computer would signal a device to open the mold.56 Although the claims 
“admittedly [employed] a well-known mathematical equation,” the Court reasoned 
that the patent only sought to foreclose others from using that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other novel steps of the invention.57 Those novel steps 
were asserted as being: (1) the continuous measuring of the mold cavity 
temperature; (2) the continuous feeding of this data into a digital computer; (3) the 
continuous recalculation of the rubber cure time by the digital computer; and (4) 
 
 
45. Id. at 64. 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 67.  
48. Id. at 71–72. 
49. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
50. Id. at 585. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 591. 
53. Id. at 594. 
54. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–93 (1981). 
55. Id. at 178–79. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 187. 
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the digital signaling by the computer to open the mold cavity.58 Accordingly, the 
Court held that the claims were eligible for patent protection under § 101 and not 
merely directed to an abstract idea.59 
By this point, if you are having trouble reconciling the Court’s decision in Flook 
with its decision in Diehr, you are not alone.60 In Flook, calculating an updated 
alarm-limit value using an algorithm, and then updating the alarm limit was not 
patentable;61 however, in Diehr, calculating a time at which to open a mold based 
on a fundamental law of nature—and then opening the mold at that time—was 
patentable.62 Although one way to reconcile these cases would simply be to 
consider the majority and dissenting Justices of each of these decisions,63 it is 
important to recognize the minor, but ultimately decisive factual differences 
between each case. For instance, the claims in Flook were directed to updating and 
generating entirely digital data, whereas the claims in Diehr were directed to a 
mechanical process whereby a computer and digital data were used in order to 
determine the exact time to open a mold. Thus, the claims in Diehr were directed 
to a more physical “process,” whereas the claims in Flook were more analogous to 
a “mental process” at that point in time in Supreme Court jurisprudence.64  
After the Diehr decision in 1981, the Supreme Court would not return to 
address the abstract idea category of judicial exceptions for nearly thirty years.65 
In the meantime, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was 
founded in 1982 as the result of a merger of the United States Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the United States Court of 
 
 
58. Id. at 178–79. 
59. Id. at 191. 
60. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598–99 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
process was patentable subject-matter because the “present claims do not preempt the formula or 
algorithm contained therein”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219–20 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the patent was ineligible subject-matter because “the invention claimed in the patent . . . 
makes no contribution to the art that is not entirely dependent upon the utilization of a computer in a 
familiar process . . . .”).  
61. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. 
62. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. 
63. In Flook, Justice Stevens penned the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, and White. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584. On the other hand, Justice Stewart 
dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. However, in Diehr Justice 
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart, and 
White joined. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175. Additionally, Justice Stevens dissented in Diehr and was joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. Thus, while the three dissenting Justices in Flook stuck to 
their guns to become part of the majority in Diehr, Justices Powell and White provided the critical swing 
votes. Id.; Flook, 437 U.S. at 584.  
64. Cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194–201 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
recent history and shifts in patent law as software-related innovations were beginning to emerge, 
including the characterization of software as a mere “mental process”). 
65. Id.; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). In Bilski, the Supreme Court relied upon the abstract 
idea exception to invalidate a patent directed to a method of hedging risk as applied to the energy 
market. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609, 612.  
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Claims.66 The Federal Circuit was established under Article III of the United States 
Constitution, granting the court nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of areas, 
including patents.67 In fact, nearly all intellectual property cases heard by the 
Federal Circuit involve patents.68 However, when conflicting views began to arise 
within the Federal Circuit as to the Supreme Court’s use of the abstract idea 
exception as a catch-all,69 in addition to how the Court’s newly introduced Mayo 
test70 should be applied with respect to software and business method inventions, 
the Court was quick to step in and set the record straight.71 
IV. A MAD TEA PARTY: ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL 
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the United States Supreme Court 
relied upon the abstract idea exception to invalidate a patent that merely claimed 
a method of doing business; and that method was carried out by a general-purpose 
computer.72 Although the relatively narrow issue before the Court was whether a 
generic-computer implementation of using a third-party intermediary to mitigate 
settlement risk was a patent-eligible invention,73 the Court’s decision created 




66. Court Jurisdiction, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. In Bilski, Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s judgment as far as he “agree[d] that 
petitioners [sought] to patent an abstract idea,” but raised the issue that the Court “does not show how 
this conclusion follows . . . from our case law.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 619–20. Justice Stevens reasoned that 
the “patent now before us is not for ‘[a] principle, in the abstract,’ or a ‘fundamental truth.’ Id. at 619. 
Nor does it claim the sort of phenomenon of nature or abstract idea that was embodied by the 
mathematical formula [sic] at issue in Gottschalk v. Benson . . . and in Flook.” Id. at 619-20. Furthermore, 
Justice Stevens reasoned that the Court asserted the conclusion that the claims were directed to an 
abstract idea without providing “a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea.” 
Id. at 621. 
70. In Mayo, a case arising shortly after Bilski, the Supreme Court formulated what is currently 
known as the Mayo test for determining whether a patent is directed to ineligible subject-matter. See 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77–80 (2012). However, the patent 
claims at issue in Mayo were directed to administering thiopurine drugs for the treatment of various 
autoimmune diseases, thus falling into the laws of nature judicial exception. Id. at 77–78. The Mayo test 
is discussed in further detail below in Section IV. 
71. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215–16 (2014) (discussing the multiple 
concurring and dissenting opinions in the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision before granting certiorari). 
72. See id. at 214–15. 
73. Robert Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part 1), BILSKI 
BLOG (June 16, 2016), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-
impact-of-a-minor-case/. 
74. James Cosgrove, Alice: Three Years On, JURISTAT (July 19, 2017), 
https://blog.juristat.com/2017/7/19/alice-three-years-on (discussing that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Alice case was “a landmark decision that significantly altered the way the courts and the [USPTO] 
handle software patents”). 
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The claims of the ‘479 patent75 at issue in Alice were directed towards 
facilitating an exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a 
computer system as a third-party intermediary in order to mitigate “settlement 
risk”— i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will 
satisfy its obligation.76 The process described by the claims provided that the 
intermediary system would create “shadow” credit and debit records mirroring the 
actual and real-time balance of capital in a party’s real-world bank account as 
transactions are entered.77 As such, the intermediary system would intercept 
certain transactions and allow “only those transactions for which” a party’s shadow 
record indicated there was sufficient capital to satisfy.78 In this way, at the end of 
the day, the intermediary system would instruct relevant financial institutions to 
execute only the “permitted” transactions, thus “mitigating the risk that only one 
party will perform the agreed-upon exchange.”79 
In invalidating these patent claims, the Court extended the Mayo test, which 
it had previously formulated to determine the eligibility of patent claims involving 
laws of nature and natural phenomena, to the abstract ideas category of the judicial 
exceptions, making clear that the Mayo test should be applied in all § 101 cases.80 
Under the Mayo test, first it must be determined whether the claims at issue are 
directed to one of the judicial exceptions, and if so, the question then becomes—
when considering each claim element individually and as an ordered combination—
whether additional elements exist to transform the nature of the claim into a 
patent-eligible application.81 As the Court noted, this second step is often regarded 
as a search for an “inventive concept” to ensure the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the judicial exception itself.82 
Applying the Mayo test, the Court first held that the claims were directed to 
the abstract idea of “intermediated settlement,”83 reasoning that intermediated 
settlement is “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of 
commerce,”84 and further noting that organizing transactions between parties is a 
“method of organizing human activity.”85 As to the second part of the Mayo test, 
the Court held that the claims failed to transform the abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention, reasoning that “an instruction to apply the abstract idea of 
 
 
75. Also at issue in the Alice case were three other patents held by petitioner Alice Corporation: 
the ‘510 patent, the ‘720 patent, and the ‘375 patent. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 n.1 
(2014). The Court further noted that the parties agreed upon claim 33 of the ‘479 patent to be 
representative of the other method claims at issue in the case. Id. at 213 n.2. 
76. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014). 
77. Id. at 213. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 214. 
80. Id. at 217–18. 
81. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 218. 
84. Id. at 219. 
85. Id. at 220 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010)). 
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intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer . . . is not 
‘enough’ to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”86 
Thus, although the Court re-affirmed and extended the Mayo test to the 
abstract idea category of patent claims, the Court offered little insight to define 
what exactly constitutes a patent-ineligible abstract idea. But why didn’t the Court 
invalidate the patent on § 102 novelty grounds? After all, intermediated settlement 
is a practice “long prevalent in our system of commerce.”87 Instead, the Court 
decided to go a different route by invalidating the patent with the abstract idea 
catch-all.88 And in effect, the Alice decision has had serious repercussions for the 
prosecution of software and business method patents, which we will briefly 
examine in the next section. 
V.  OFF WITH THEIR HEADS: POST-ALICE SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS METHOD 
PATENTS 
Although some believe that the Court intended the decision in Alice to be a 
relatively narrow holding, the case has been interpreted broadly by the federal 
courts and the USPTO, thereby having a vast impact on the validity question for 
software and business method patents.89 First, this section will examine 
prosecution statistics for computer technology and e-commerce related art units of 
the USPTO, with emphasis on the rate of § 101 rejections issued before and after 
the Alice decision. Second, this section will discuss the challenges with the most 
common application of the Mayo approach: analogizing claims at issue with claims 
previously held to be eligible by the courts to determine whether a claimed 
invention recites statutory subject-matter. 
A. Prosecution Statistics Post-Alice 
Before the Alice decision, § 101 eligibility-based rejections made up only 
30.8% “of all rejections issued in the e-commerce art units” of the USPTO.90 Two 
years after the Alice decision, however, the percentage of § 101 rejections had 
nearly tripled to 81.7% of all rejections issued in those same art units.91 Additionally, 
the percentage of § 101 rejections citing Alice has generally increased every quarter 
since May of 2014.92  Potentially more troubling, however, is that applicants 
responding to an Alice rejection in a final office action choose to file a request for 
continued examination (RCE) only 65.1% of the time, while 18.4% choose to 
abandon their application all-together.93 
 
 
86. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 226 (2014) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 64 (1972)) (emphasis removed). 
87. Id. at 219. 
88. Id. at 212. 
89. See Sachs, supra note 73 (discussing how the Court considered Alice a “minor” case that 
addressed a “relatively narrow issue”). 
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Although eligibility-based rejections citing Alice can be found all over the 
various technology centers94 of the USPTO, 95 roughly two-thirds of them are found 
in technology center (TC) 3600 as shown in Figure 1 below.96 As the home of art 
units covering business methods, this technology center was hit particularly hard 




94. The structure of the USPTO for examining patent applications is broken down, first, by 
technology center (TC), and second, by art unit within a given TC. Cf. Cosgrove, supra note 74 (discussing 
Alice based rejection statistics for art units in the 3620s, 3680s, and 3690s within TC 3600). For instance, 
TC 2800 provides examination for patent applications directed to semiconductors, electrical and optical 
systems and components, etc., whereas TC 3700 examines applications including mechanical 
engineering, manufacturing, and products. Patent Technology Centers Management, UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technology-
centers-management (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). Building on this, Art Unit 2811 of TC 2800 examines 
patent applications relating to memory and semiconductors, while Art Unit 2831 of TC 2800 examines 
applications relating to electrical circuits and systems. TC 2800 Management Roster, UNITED STATES PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/tc-2800-management-roster 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
95. Cosgrove, supra note 74. 
96. Sarah Garber, Avoiding Alice Rejections with Predictive Analytics, IPWATCHDOG (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/31/avoiding-alice-rejections-predictive-analytics/id=69519/. 
97. Id.  




Looking further into TC 3600, the vast majority of Alice rejections (92.4%) are 
issued by the 3620s, 3680s, and 3690s e-commerce art units, with almost half of 
these (40.4%) being found in the 3620s alone.98 Additionally, the average Alice 
rejection rate per application across all art units in the 3620s, ‘80s, and ‘90s is 
75.2%.99 And while applicants throughout the 3620s, ‘80s, and ‘90s “can likely 
expect an Alice rejection, the Alice rejection rate” varies by art unit.100 For instance, 
“the art unit with the highest Alice rejection rate” at 85.8% of all applications is Art 
Unit 3625, while Art Unit 3685 claims the lowest Alice rejection rate at 41.41%, 
which is quite a bit below average for TC 3600.101 Accordingly, and as a result of 
these statistical differences between art units, getting an application placed in a 
specific art unit (such as 3685) could potentially be a huge advantage for applicants 
seeking an e-commerce related patent.  
 In addition, while eligibility-based rejections are one thing for a patent 
applicant, a notice of allowance is another; and the statistics showing how often 
applicants receive a notice of allowance from art units in TC 3600 are just as 
staggering and inconsistent. Thus, it is no wonder why critics regard TC 3600 as the 
place “where patent applications go to die”;102 and looking at the allowance rates 
of certain art units, this statement is not far from the truth. For instance, in a time 
span of eighteen months from January 2015 to July 2016, only fifteen patents were 
issued by Art Unit 3689, while 597 applications went abandoned—103corresponding 
to an allowance rate of only 2.5%. However, during this same time period, Art Unit 
3628 achieved nearly 5 times the allowance rate of Art Unit 3689, even though both 
of these art units examine the exact same type of application subject-matter.104 In 
contrast to Art Unit 3689, Art Unit 3628 allowed seventy-eight patents during the 
same time frame, while 547 applications went abandoned—105corresponding to a 
total allowance rate of 12.5%. Thus, the inconsistencies in Alice rejections issued 
among art units of the USPTO may also be leading to inconsistencies in the amount 
of total allowed patents among those art units. 
 Aside from e-commerce and business method art units, Alice rejections are 
also beginning to appear more frequently in computer-related technology centers 
across the USPTO in general.106 For instance, prior to the Alice decision only 12.3% 
of office actions issued across TCs 2100, 2400, and 2600 included an eligibility-
 
 




101. Id.  
102. Gene Quinn, E-Commerce Art Units: Where Patent Applications Go to Die, IPWATCHDOG (July 
14, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/07/14/where-patent-applications-go-die/id=70913/.  
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
106. Samuel Hayim & Kate Gaudry, Eligibility Rejections Are Appearing in Greater Frequency 
Across All Computer Related Technology Centers, IPWATCHDOG (May 24, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/24/eligibility-rejections-greater-frequency-uspto/id=97615/.   
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based rejection;107 and about two-and-a-half years after Alice this percentage had 
increased only slightly to 14.6%.108 However, by October of 2017, the frequency of 
Alice rejections among these technology centers jumped to 25.0% and then further 
climbed to 29.3% by December of that same year.109 Thus, the prevalence of 
eligibility-based rejections in computer-related TCs doubled across 2017, even 
though the amount of eligibility-based rejections had remained relatively the same 
before—as well as for roughly three years after—the Court’s decision in Alice.110  
This statistical data of § 101 rejections discussed above is likely indicative of a 
struggle with applying the Alice decision in the USPTO, especially as applied to 
software and business method innovations. Furthermore, as innovation in 
computer related technology continues to explode in the Digital Revolution, it is 
very likely that eligibility-based rejections will continue to increase, as well, absent 
clear direction from a higher authority. 
B. Analogizing Claims to Inconsistent Precedent 
Another issue of concern after Alice is the practice of analogizing the claims of 
an allegedly abstract patent/application to prior court precedent to determine 
whether the claims at issue recite statutory subject-matter.111 Although the 
abstract idea exception was created as a result of Supreme Court jurisprudence,112 
the Court has reluctantly “declined to define abstract ideas.”113 Instead, the Court 
has decided to identify abstract ideas “by referring to earlier precedent, e.g., by 
comparing a claimed concept to the concepts previously identified as abstract ideas 
by the courts.”114 As a result, the USPTO, the courts, and practitioners are left to 
struggle with this “patentability-by-analogy” analytical process as well.115 
Although taking a hint from claims held to be eligible in past decisions may 
provide some insight, and while this strategy has proven effective in many 
situations, the lack of positive examples to utilize makes for a challenging process 
to determine whether a patent truly claims statutory subject-matter.116 For 
instance, starting in 2014, the USPTO has issued updated examiner guidance 







111. See Andrew Gabriel, Doc’s Orders: Analogize to Overcome Patent Eligibility Rejections, 
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/17/analogize-overcome-patent-
eligibility-rejections/id=78443/. 
112. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–602 (2010). 
113. MPEP § 2106.04(a) (9th ed. rev. Jan. 2018). 
114. Id. 
115. See generally id. 
116. Cf. Andrew Gabriel, Doc’s Orders: Analogize to Overcome Patent Eligibility Rejections, 
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/17/analogize-overcome-patent-
eligibility-rejections/id=78443/. 
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eligibility.117 These guidance materials include examples of eligible/ineligible claims, 
reference sheets, memoranda on court decisions regarding patentable subject-
matter, updates to the MPEP, and more.118  
The most recent of these examiner guidance updates was issued on January 
7, 2019.119 In this release of subject-matter eligibility guidance, which we will 
discuss in further detail below, the USPTO strongly scrutinized the Mayo test and 
its inherent process of analogizing claims to determine eligibility.120 For instance, 
the USPTO stated that the Mayo test was effective for a short period of time after 
Alice was decided, but that “it has since become impractical.”121 In asserting that 
the Mayo test has become impractical, the USPTO seemed to point fingers at the 
Federal Circuit for issuing too many decisions “identifying subject matter as abstract 
or non-abstract in the context of specific cases.”122 Although significant precedent 
in a specific area of law is generally welcomed by those looking for a bright-lined 
rule, the USPTO argued that (1) “similar subject matter has been described both as 
abstract and not abstract in different cases”; (2) the “growing body of precedent 
has become increasingly more difficult for examiners to apply in a predictable 
manner”; and (3) “concerns have been raised that different examiners within and 
between technology centers may reach inconsistent results” when determining 
whether claims are abstract.123   
As an additional note, courts in the United Kingdom would likely agree with 
the USPTO. In fact, U.K. courts have explicitly cautioned examiners in relying on the 
specific facts of any court judgment as support for an objection because “little or 
no benefit is to be gained by drawing analogies with other cases decided on 
different facts in relation to different inventions.”124 These courts have further 
rationalized that “[s]imply because it is possible to construct a generalised [sic] 
category which includes both the claimed invention . . . and a previous decision in 
which a claim was held to be patentable, does not help.”125 Rather, it only “shows 
that such things can be patentable in some cases but does not show that the 
invention in [another] case is patentable.”126  
Taking the prior sections into consideration, it becomes clear that some kind 
of direction from a higher authority is needed to determine what is statutory 
subject-matter post-Alice. Until Congress or the Supreme Court answers this 
question, however, the future of software and business method patents will likely 
continue to be uncertain. But how should this question be answered? While some 
 
 
117. See generally Subject Matter Eligibility (Examination Guidance by Date of Issuance), UNITED 
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-
policy/subject-matter-eligibility-examination-guidance-date (last updated Jan. 15, 2019). 
118. Id. 
119. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, (Jan. 7, 2019) 
[hereinafter 2019 Revised Guidance]. 
120. Id.  
121. Id. at 52. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Research In Motion UK Ltd. v. Inpro Licensing SARL [2006] EWHC 70 (Pat) [186] (Eng.). 
125. Lantana Ltd. v. Comptroller-General of Patents [2013] EWHC 2673 (Pat) [17] (Eng.). 
126. Id. 
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believe that the answer should simply be binary,127 others, and quite possibly the 
majority of advocates, believe the answer should be more of a matter of degree.128 
But if the answer is in the form of a matter of degree, where is the correct place to 
draw the line as to what constitutes statutory subject-matter? The next section 
probes this question. 
VI. ADVICE FROM A CATERPILLAR: DETERMINING THE CORRECT PLACE TO DRAW 
THE LINE FOR SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
Although the Alice opinion cast doubt on the future of software and business 
method patents, the opinion did not absolutely bar such inventions.129 In fact, the 
Court has stated that Alice and other prior opinions should not be read too broadly 
as to completely bar eligibility for software and business method patents.130 In 
saying so, the Court generally reasons that absent direct legislation from Congress, 
the Court will not outright bar any field of inventions, at least other than those 
directed toward one of the judicial exceptions.131  
This section will explore the current state of the law for patentable subject-
matter, with the intention of finding a reasonable place to draw the line for what 
constitutes patentable subject matter.  First, this section will take an in depth look 
at case law development in the Federal Circuit. Second, this section will review the 
most recently issued examiner guidance from the USPTO. Third, the Restoring 
America’s Leadership in Innovation Act’s proposed amendment to 35 U.S.C. 101 will 
be examined. And finally, this section will look at foreign patent systems and how 
subject-matter eligibility is determined in other jurisdictions. 
 
 
127. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 227 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I 
adhere to the view that any ‘claim that merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as 
a ‘process' under § 101.’”) (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 614); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 626 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Methods of doing business fall outside of the subject matter that has 
‘historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws,’ and likely go beyond what the 
modern patent ‘statute was enacted to protect.’”) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184; Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that under the “mental steps” doctrine, well-settled principles of patent law “would have prevented the 
issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program”). 
128. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (“We tread carefully in construing 
this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2011) (explaining that “too broad an interpretation” of the judicial exceptions 
“could eviscerate patent law”). 
129. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).  
130. See id. at 221 (explaining that the Court was not attempting to “delimit the precise contours 
of the ‘abstract ideas’ category”). 
131. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Absent a 
discernible signal from Congress, we proceed cautiously when dealing with patents that press on the 
limits of the ‘standard written into the Constitution,’ for at the ‘fringes of congressional power,’ ‘more 
is required of legislatures than a vague delegation to be filled in later.’”) (quoting Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1996); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 139–40 (1959)). 
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A. Case Law Development in the Federal Circuit 
In the roughly five years since the Supreme Court decided Alice, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has slowly chipped away at defining more exact 
boundaries for eligible software or business method patents.  Along the lines of the 
Mayo framework, the Federal Circuit has issued instructive, precedential decisions 
finding patentable subject-matter in both steps of the Mayo framework.132 This 
subsection will take an in depth look at developments in case law, first at Mayo step 
one, and then at Mayo step two. 
i. Emerging Rules at Mayo Step One 
In trying to reconcile the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence amidst the Digital 
Revolution, where many long-practiced activities are being implemented on a 
computer, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has issued various decisions 
finding patent claims eligible at Mayo step one.133 As noted above, step one of the 
Mayo test involves the broad question of whether the claims at issue are “directed 
to” one of the judicial exceptions, e.g., an abstract idea.134 At Mayo step one, little 
to no instruction has been provided with respect to business methods; however, 
software-related patent claims have been deemed patent eligible in a limited 
number of ways.135  
For example, patent claims directed to a specific improvement in computer-
related technology are patent eligible and not merely directed to an abstract 
idea.136 In Enfish the Federal Circuit considered claims directed to a “self-
referential” database that, contrary to conventional techniques, included all data 
entities in a single table, with column definitions provided by rows in that same 
table.137 Among other things, the patents at issue described multiple advantages 
over prior art that were made possible by utilizing such a design.138 These 
advantages included an indexing technique allowing for faster searching of data, as 
well as a self-referential model allowing for more effective storage of complex data 
types, such as images and unstructured text.139 In reasoning that the claims at issue 
were directed to a specific improvement in the way a computer operates, the court 
noted that the claimed invention not only improved upon conventional prior art 
 
 
132. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that 
a claimed solution that is “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem 
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks” is patent-eligible); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 
822 F.3d 1327, 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding patent claims directed to a “self-referential” database 
eligible at Mayo step one); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding patent claims directed filtering content on the internet patent eligible at 
Mayo step 2).   
133. E.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft 
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
134. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014). 
135. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1330. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1331–33. 
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databases, but that the self-referential data table recited in the claims was a specific 
type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves 
data in memory.140 As such, the court held that the claims were patent-eligible as 
being directed to a specific implementation of a solution to an existing problem in 
the software arts.141 
Building off the precedent set forth in Enfish and other cases,142 the Federal 
Circuit recently issued two precedential decisions finding claims directed to 
software-related inventions patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and not merely 
directed to an abstract idea.143 Both of these decisions are consistent with a 
growing body of precedent from the Federal Circuit “confirming that software-
based innovations can make ‘non-abstract improvements to computer technology’ 
and be deemed patent-eligible subject matter [in] the first step of the [ ]Mayo 
analysis.”144 
For instance, in Finjan, the claimed invention involved a method of virus 
scanning that scans an application program, generates a security profile identifying 
any potentially suspicious code in the program, and links the security profile to the 
application program.145 In holding the patent claims eligible, the court reasoned 
that the claimed method recited specific steps for generating a security profile that 
identifies both hostile and potentially hostile operations to protect a user against 
both previously unknown viruses and “obfuscated code,” unlike traditional virus 
scanning, which only recognized the presence of previously-identified viruses.146 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the claims at issue accomplished a result 
that realized an improvement in computer functionality and were thus not directed 
to an abstract idea.147 
Additionally, in Core Wireless, the claimed invention involved a graphical user 
interface (GUI) for mobile devices that displayed an application summary of each 
application on the main menu while those applications are in an unlaunched 
state.148 Additionally, the claims contained precise language delimiting the type of 
data to be displayed and how to display it, thus improving upon conventional user 
 
 
140. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337–39. 
141. Id. at 1339. 
142. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The 
Federal Circuit in McRO generally held that patent claims directed to automating prior art techniques on 
a computer, which were previously capable of being performed only by a human, are patent eligible if 
they enable a computing device to perform—and improve upon—those prior art techniques. See id. 
143. See, e.g., Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Core Wireless 
Licensing S.A.R.L., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
144. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MEMORANDUM ON RECENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS 
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-recent-sme-ctdec-
20180402.PDF.  
145. Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303–04 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
146. Id. at 1304–05. 
147. Id. at 1305–06. 
148. Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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interfaces to increase the efficiency of using mobile devices.149 After reasoning that 
the claims were directed to an improved user interface for electronic devices, 
rather than the abstract idea of an index, the court held the patent recited statutory 
subject-matter under § 101.150 
Thus, at least in the past three years since the Federal Circuit decided Enfish, 
the general rule has remained relatively the same: software-related patent claims 
are eligible for patent protection when they are directed to specific improvements 
in computer-related technology.151 While this rule seems relatively straightforward 
and easy to apply, it is important to remember that not all software-related patents 
strictly claim software that may affect a computer’s functionality. For instance, 
what about business methods that are implemented on a computer? Perhaps this 
is why the Court provided a fallback argument for such inventions at Mayo step 
two. 
ii. Emerging Rules at Mayo Step Two 
In addition to those cases mentioned above finding statutory subject matter 
at Mayo step one, the Federal Circuit has also issued decisions finding patent claims 
directed to software and business method inventions eligible at Mayo step two.152 
As described above, step two of the Mayo test requires examining the elements of 
each claim individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the 
claim contains an “inventive concept.”153 However, at least as compared to Mayo 
step one, the Federal Circuit seems to have issued fewer decisions finding that a 
software or business method patent contains an inventive concept. 
For example, an inventive concept can be found in the “non-conventional and 
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.”154 For instance, in 
BASCOM, the patent claims were generally directed to filtering content on the 
internet, and, as the court noted, filtering content is an abstract idea because it is a 
“longstanding, well-known method of organizing human behavior.”155 However, 
the inventive concept described and claimed in the patent was the installation of a 
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from end-users, and with customizable 
filtering features specific to each end-user.156 After reasoning that the inventor’s 
specifically claimed design gave the filtering tool the benefits of both a filter on a 
local computer and a filter on an internet service provider’s (ISP) server, the court 





151. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
152. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. 
v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Amdocs (Isr.), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
153. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2011)). 
154. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
155. Id. at 1348. 
156. Id. at 1350. 
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method of filtering Internet content” that was not conventional or generic, and 
therefore patent eligible.157 
Furthermore, whether a claim element or combination is “well-understood, 
routine and conventional” to a person having ordinary skill in the art is a question 
of fact, and merely because something is disclosed in prior art does not mean that 
it is a well-understood, routine, conventional activity or element.158 In Berkheimer, 
the invention related to “digitally processing and archiving files in a digital asset 
management system,” and the patent specification explained that the claimed 
system eliminated redundant storage of common text and graphical elements, 
thereby improving system operating efficiency and reducing storage costs.159 At 
Mayo step one, the court held that the claims were directed to various abstract 
ideas.160 However, at Mayo step two the court came to a different conclusion, 
observing that the specification discussed purported improvements and that those 
very improvements were specifically contained in certain claims of the patent.161 As 
such, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether those 
purported improvements were more than well-understood, routine, and 
conventional activity previously known in the industry, and thus remanded the case 
for a determination of that question.162  
Thus, under step two of the Mayo test, claims reciting a non-conventional and 
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces contain an inventive 
concept and are patent eligible.163 Furthermore, whether a claim element or 
combination of elements is “well-understood, routine and conventional” is a 
question of fact that does not simply turn on whether something was disclosed in 
prior art.164 But aren’t these questions under step two of the Mayo test just another 
way to probe the questions of novelty and nonobviousness that would typically be 
addressed under §§ 102 and 103? A search for an “inventive concept” certainly 
sounds like a section 102 or 103 question. And surely any patent claim directed to 
a non-conventional arrangement of known, conventional pieces that is sufficient to 
be patent-eligible at Mayo step two is also patent-eligible under §§ 102 and 103. 




158. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367–69 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
159. Id. at 1362–63. 
160. Id. at 1366–67. The court held that the claims were directed to the “abstract ideas of parsing 
and comparing data” (claims 1-3 and 9), “parsing, comparing, and storing data” (claim 4), and “parsing, 
comparing, storing, and editing data” (claims 5-7) based upon a comparison of these claims to claims 
held to be abstract in prior Federal Circuit decisions. Id. 
161. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369–70. The Federal Circuit ruled claims 1-3 and 9 ineligible 
because they did not include limitations that realized the purported improvements described in the 
specification, however, the court held that claims 4-7 did contain specific limitations directed to those 
purported improvements. Id. 
162. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370–71. 
163. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
164. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367–69 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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B. 2019 Revised Patent Subject-Matter Eligibility Guidance 
As noted above in Section III(B), the USPTO has issued several different rounds 
of updated examiner guidance, in addition to updates to the Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP), regarding what constitutes patentable subject-
matter post-Alice.165 The most recent of these updates was issued on January 7, 
2019.166 This update, however, was different than most prior examination guidance 
updates, which mostly would interpret how to apply post-Alice Federal Circuit 
decisions in light of the Mayo test to determine whether claims recited statutory 
subject-matter under § 101.167 Instead, the January 2019 update completely revised 
the procedures for determining whether a patent claim is directed to an abstract 
idea under step one of the Mayo test,168 with the ultimate goal of “draw[ing] 
distinctions between claims to principles in the abstract and claims that integrate 
those principles into a practical application.”169 
As set forth in the January 2019 update, the USPTO essentially revised its prior 
guidance at Mayo step one from a single question into a two-prong analysis.170 In 
prong one, examiners must determine whether the claim at issue “recites” an 
abstract idea, which ultimately turns into a two-step approach.171 First, the 
examiner must identify one or more specific limitations in the claim that he or she 
believes recites an abstract idea.172 Next, the examiner must determine whether 
that specific limitation(s) falls within one of the enumerated groupings of abstract 
ideas identified by the USPTO, rather than comparing the claimed concept to the 
USPTO’s prior ‘‘Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.’’173 
These enumerated groupings of abstract ideas include (a) mathematical concepts, 
such as formulas, equations, or calculations; (b) certain methods of organizing 
human activity—for instance, fundamental economic principles or practices, 
commercial or legal interactions, or managing personal behavior, relationships or 
interactions between people; and (c) mental processes, e.g., concepts performed 
in the human mind.174 If, however, the identified limitation(s) falls within one of the 
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas, the examiner should then proceed to 
prong two.175 
In prong two, examiners must assess whether the claim, as a whole, contains 
additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a “practical application.”176 
Similar to prong one, examiners must follow a two-step approach to determine 
whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application.177 
 
 
165. See generally Subject Matter Eligibility, supra note 117. 
166. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, (Jan. 7, 2019). 
167. See generally Subject Matter Eligibility, supra note 117. 
168. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. 
169. Id. at 51. 
170. Id. at 50. 
171. Id. at 53. 
172. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 52. 
175. Id. at 54. 
176. Id.  
177. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. 
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First, the examiner must identify whether additional elements exist in the claim 
beyond the judicial exception(s), and, second, he or she must evaluate those 
additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they 
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.178 Under this second 
step, the examiner must rely on court precedent to determine if the judicial 
exception is sufficiently integrated into a practical application.179 For example, an 
examiner may conclude that a software-related patent claim is integrated into a 
practical application if it is directed to an improvement in computer technology.180 
After proceeding through this new two prong approach at Mayo step one, the 
examination of a patent claim under § 101 may proceed as normal to step two of 
the Mayo test.181 Although this change in examiner guidance could potentially 
streamline the examination process by providing a more robust way to approach 
questions of subject-matter eligibility, the guidance does have some drawbacks.  
First, because examiner guidance does not constitute substantive rulemaking and 
does not have the same force and effect of law,182 the guidance could potentially 
be struck down by the Supreme Court at any time. Second, if the examination 
guidelines were struck down by the Court, patent holders who may have acquired 
their patent grant under the new guidance could potentially be stripped of that 
patent in a subsequent court proceeding. Third, the two-step Mayo test now seems 
to have mushroomed into a six- or seven-step analysis.  Thus, although the updated 
guidance may be a step in the right direction for settling the issue of what 
constitutes statutory subject-matter under § 101 post-Alice, the guidance may not 
be the best long-term solution. On the other hand, a proposed congressional 
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 101, as discussed next in Subsection C, could be an 
answer for a long-term, practical solution. 
C. Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018 
On June 28, 2018, during the second session of the 115th Congress, 
Congressman Massie, on behalf of himself, Ms. Kaptur, and Mr. Rohrabacher, 
presented House Bill 6264, formally known as the “Restoring America’s Leadership 
in Innovation Act of 2018” (RALI Act).183 The RALI Act made various underlying 
findings, alleging that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and various decisions of 
the Supreme Court “have harmed the progress of Science and the useful Arts by 
eroding the strength and value of the patent system,” and additionally that the Act 




179. Id. at 55. 
180. See id. at 55 n.25. 
181. Id. at 56. 
182. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. 
183. See Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264, 115th Cong. (2018) 
[hereinafter RALI Act]. 
184. Id. § 2. 
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Thus, the stated purpose of the RALI Act is to “promote the leadership of the United 
States in global innovation by establishing a robust patent system that restores and 
protects the right of inventors to own and enforce private property rights in 
inventions and discoveries, and for other purposes.”185  
In addition to proposing an unlikely and questionable repeal of the first-to-file 
system under the America Invents Act,186 the RALI Act also proposed several 
amendments to the current U.S. patent system, including a proposed amendment 
to 35 U.S.C. § 101.187 The proposed amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 101 would create 
three subsections within the code provision as follows: 
 
(a) IN GENERAL—Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject 
to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
(b)  EXCEPTION—A claimed invention is ineligible patent subject matter 
under subsection (a) if the claimed invention as a whole, as understood 
by a person having ordinary skill in the art, exists in nature 
independently of and prior to any human activity, or exists solely in the 
human mind. 
(c)  ELIGIBILITY STANDARD—The eligibility of a claimed invention under 
subsections (a) and (b) shall be determined without regard as to the 
requirements or conditions of sections 102, 103, and 112 of this title, 
or the claimed invention’s inventive concept.188 
 
Thus, while subsection (a) merely recites § 101 in its current form verbatim,189 
subsections (b) and (c) add new substance to § 101 by codifying exceptions to 
patentability and setting new eligibility standards.190  
In justifying this proposed amendment to § 101, the RALI Act provides that it 
is the sense of Congress that the U.S. patent system must “protect and encourage 
research and development . . . in the life sciences, computer sciences, and other 
disciplines” by providing scientists and inventors with “certainty that their 
discoveries and inventions are entitled to patent protection.”191 Furthermore, the 
RALI Act asserts that the amendment to § 101 “effectively abrogates” the Alice 
decision and its predecessors to “ensure that life sciences discoveries, computer 
software, and similar inventions and discoveries are patentable, and that those 
patents are enforceable.”192 In accordance with this, the language in subsection (b) 
regarding “human activity” is critical for reinvigorating the patentability of medical 
advances, which were curtailed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo, while the 
language about inventions “existing solely in the human mind” is directed to 
 
 
185. RALI Act, supra note 183. 
186. Id. § 3(a). 
187. Id. § 7(a). 
188. Id. 
189. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
190. See RALI Act, supra note 183, § 7(a). 
191. Id. § 7(b)(2). 
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reviving the issuance of software and business method patents restrained by 
Alice.193 
Some patent scholars have regarded the RALI Act as “America’s best hope to 
restore sanity and prosperity to the U.S. patent system.”194 However, as is the case 
with many proposed House bills in Congress, the chances of the RALI Act making its 
way through the entire legislative process and being signed into law are slim to 
none,195 and critics have been quick to point this out.196 Thus, while the RALI Act is 
potentially the answer that pro-software and business method patentee advocates 
have been waiting for, it appears to be unlikely that the RALI Act will pass in the 
near future, at least as it currently is drafted.  But what if the Act just proposed an 
amendment to § 101 rather than a complete repeal of first-to-file and other 
provisions of the America Invents Act? If that were the case, the Act would likely 
find endorsement from a broader range of supporters and thus have a better 
chance at becoming law.     
D. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  (TRIPS) and Foreign 
Patent Systems 
 Although determining the extent to which software and business method 
patents are eligible for protection under § 101 is solely a question for the U.S. 
patent system’s consideration, it is important to keep in mind the obligations the 
United States has as a member country of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
under the TRIPS agreement.197 Additionally, to help maintain consistency with other 
member countries of the WTO, it is arguably “best practice” to keep patentable 
subject-matter standards consistent between member countries so that a patentee 
does not receive patent protection in one member country, while being denied 
 
 
193. Steve Brachmann, Legislation Introduced in House to Repeal the PTAB and the AIA, 
IPWATCHDOG (July 17, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/legislation-house-repeal-ptab-
aia/id=99059/. 
194. Id. 
195. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Legislation: Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation, PATENTLY-
O (July 2, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/07/legislation-leadership-innovation.html (Noting 
that “this proposal has a 0% likelihood of passing this Congress, but it has been introduced and offers an 
interesting discussion point.”); Bradley Roush, Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, 
FOLEY (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.foley.com/restoring-americas-leadership-in-innovation-act-of-
2018-08-16-2018/ (explaining that the RALI Act bill is “highly unlikely to become law”).  
196. See Crouch, supra note 195. For instance, one critic stated that “this bill has ZERO chance in 
passing, and we also know they can not and will not pass anything pro patent, Google, Amazon, 
Microsoft, Facebook have the Senate and House in the back of their pockets. Silicon Valley elites own 
the vote.” Jason Lee, Comment to Legislative Steps in the Pro-patent Direction, IPWATCHDOG (July 8, 2018, 
1:38 PM), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/08/legislative-steps-pro-patent-direction/id=99068/; 
see also Valuationguy, Comment to Legislation Introduced in House to Repeal the PTAB and the AIA, 
IPWatchdog (July 17, 2018, 8:47 AM), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/legislation-house-
repeal-ptab-aia/id=99059/ (“this bill has ZERO chance of getting through the necessary subcommittees 
and Committee in the House of Reps”). 
197. See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 56 
 
408 
patent protection in another member country for not claiming patentable subject-
matter. Accordingly, this subsection will first explore the requirements for 
patentable subject-matter under TRIPS, and then look at various WTO member 
jurisdictions, such as Canada and the European Union, to see just what they have 
to say about the eligibility of software and business method patents. 
i. TRIPS Take on Patent Subject-Matter Eligibility 
Article 1 of TRIPS provides that member countries “may, but shall not be 
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by 
this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions 
of this Agreement.”198 Furthermore, Article 1 provides that members “shall be free 
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”199 Thus, the TRIPS 
agreement, like the United States Constitution, provides a floor rather than a ceiling 
for the intellectual property laws of its member countries.200 And this floor is 
essentially non-existent for software-related and business method patents.201 
According to Article 27 of TRIPS, and subject to a couple of exceptions, 
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.”202 Expanding on the Article 27 definition, the two 
“terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a 
member [country] to be synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful,’ 
respectively.”203 As such, the general provision for what is patentable subject-
matter under TRIPS is strikingly similar to 35 U.S.C. § 101204 and has no substantial 
bearing on the validity of software and business method patents.  
Additionally, like the general provision for patentable subject-matter in Article 
27, the exceptions listed in Article 27 do not affect the validity of software and 
business method patents either.205 First, these exceptions merely state that 
member states may exclude from patent protection inventions that may be 
immoral, dangerous to health, or prejudicial to the environment;206 member 
countries may also exclude certain medical methods for treating humans or 
 
 
198. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (as amended on 23 
January 2017), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, art. 1, ¶ 1 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (emphasis added). 
199. Id. 
200. See generally Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of 
Constitutional Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 NW. U. LAW REV. COLLOQUY 365 (2008) (discussing how 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution creates a floor for remedies). 
201. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 198, art. 27, ¶ 1.  
202. Id. 
203. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 198, n.5. 
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
205. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 198, art. 27. 
206. Id. art. 27, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
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animals,207 in addition to plants, animals, and certain biological processes.208 
Second, these exceptions are entirely permissive and member countries do not 
have to exclude inventions directed to one of the exceptions listed above.209 Thus, 
software and business method patents are eligible for patenting under TRIPS. 
In fact, a strict reading of Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement could lead to the 
conclusion that software and business method patents are more than just allowable 
by member countries; rather, they are implicitly required. As quoted above, 
member countries must provide patent protection for “any inventions, . . . in all 
fields of technology,” subject to a few conditions.210 And furthermore, there is no 
provided exception in TRIPS for member countries to refuse patent protection for 
software or business method patents.211 Therefore, so long as the U.S. remains a 
member of the WTO, and absent any amendments to TRIPS with respect to 
patentable subject-matter, it is highly unlikely that there will be an outright bar on 
software and business method patents in the United States. With this proposition 
in mind, let’s take a look at what is going on North of our border. 
ii. Canadian Subject-Matter Eligibility 
Up and until China stole the show in 2015 as the United States’ biggest overall 
trade partner in foreign commerce, Canada, naturally, was the United States’ 
biggest overall partner in foreign trade.212 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
however, Canada still remains the United States’ biggest partner in foreign exports, 
where the amount of goods exported in 2018 accounted for a total of $276.4 billion 
as of November.213 Given that Canada is such a huge player in trade with the United 
States, it would seem fitting that laws in each respective country should be 
relatively consistent, including intellectual property laws. So, what does Canada 
have to say about software and business method patents?214 
 
 
207. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3(a). 
208. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3(b). 
209. See id. art. 27, ¶¶ 2, 3 (stating that member states “may exclude from patentability…”). 
210. Id. art. 27, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
211. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 198, art. 27, ¶¶ 2, 3. 
212. Sarah Gray, These Are the Biggest U.S. Trading Partners, FORTUNE, 
http://fortune.com/2018/03/07/biggest-us-trade-partners/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2018 1:38 PM).  
213. Top Trading Partners – November 2018, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1811yr.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2019). 
214. Although this paper will not be discussing Chinese patent law, it is sufficient for our purposes 
to know that China revised its examination guidelines in 2017 to address software and business method 
inventions. Gene Quinn, Navigating the Patent Landscape in China, IPWATCHDOG (May 23, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/23/navigating-patent-landscape-china/id=97611/. Under these 
revisions, software related innovations can be protected under Chinese patent law as a “‘computer 
program product,’ ‘a machine-readable medium,’ and ‘an apparatus comprising a process configured to 
execute instructions on a computer-readable medium.’” Id. Additionally, “[w]ith respect to business 
methods, claims relating to business models that include a technical feature in addition to business rules 
or methods are patent eligible under the new guidelines.” Id. 
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Although the Canadian patent system is relatively silent with respect to 
business methods, it does provide helpful guidance for software and computer-
implemented patents in general. For instance, a computer software program, when 
claimed per se, is deemed an abstract scheme, plan, or set of rules for operating a 
computer and is not an invention within the meaning of the Canadian Patent Act.215 
However, in certain circumstances software can be patent eligible, and the 
Canadian Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP) provides specific, helpful 
guidelines for patent stakeholders to use in attaining a software-related patent.216 
These guidelines explain the mechanics of how a software patent claim should be 
drafted, as well as how an examiner should determine whether the claimed 
software itself recites a patentable concept.217  
When drafting, the form of a software patent claim is critically important.218 
As a whole, the claim should be directed to a physical memory storing software 
program, and “the preamble must clearly direct the claim to a physical product 
limited by the computer program stored thereon . . . not to a computer program 
limited by having been stored on a memory.”219 For example, a preamble claiming 
“‘a physical memory having stored thereon . . .’ directs the claim to a statutory 
embodiment, whereas ‘a computer program stored on a physical memory’ directs 
the claim to a computer program and thus to excluded subject-matter.”220 And 
finally, “it must be explicitly defined that the computer program is present as 
machine-executable code.”221 Only under these formalities will a patent claim 
directed to a software program be eligible for protection in Canada.222   
As noted above, in addition to offering guidelines for software claim drafting 
formalities, the MOPOP further provides the test to determine whether a software 
patent claim recites a patentable concept.223 Under this test, a claim will include 
statutory subject-matter when the software “program would cause the device it 
controls to provide a technological solution to a technological problem,” in addition 
to the software program being novel and inventive.224 And as summed up in the 
MOPOP, these are the “circumstances under which a software product comprising 
a physical memory storing executable code can be patented.”225 
In building on its layers of guidance, the MOPOP also provides instructions and 
examples for determining the eligibility of computer-implemented inventions.226 As 
with software patent claims, the eligibility of computer-implemented patent claims 
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also hinges on whether the claimed system, method, or device provides a 
“technological solution to a technological problem.”227 In examples, while 
presuming novelty and ingenuity, the MOPOP suggests that patent claims involving 
(a) new computer hardware, (b) known computer hardware controlled by new 
software, or (c) a new arrangement of known computer hardware controlled by 
new software, provide technological solutions to technological problems and would 
be viewed as patent eligible.228 Thus, the Canadian patent system is relatively 
generous when it comes to granting patents for general computer-implemented 
inventions. 
As shown from the foregoing, the Canadian patent system and the MOPOP 
provide more robust solutions for examiners, stakeholders, and attorneys to 
determine whether a software- or computer-implemented invention recites 
statutory subject-matter. Likely the most unique provision that differs from the U.S. 
patent system is how the MOPOP lays out the exact language that claim drafters 
should be using, and that examiners should be expecting, when dealing with 
software-related patent claims, likely leading to more uniformity and consistency 
for issuing software-related patents. 
iii. Subject-Matter Eligibility in the European Union 
In recent years, industry experts have noted that the United States’ approach 
to the patentability of software and business method innovations seems to be 
converging, at least somewhat, with the approach taken by the European Patent 
Office (EPO).229 However, there are still many differences between the two patent 
systems, and the EPO offers brighter-lined analysis tools to determine what 
constitutes patentable subject-matter in these two areas. 
Article 52 of the European Patent Convention provides the general rule for 
patentable subject-matter in the European Union (EU), following the same 
language as the TRIPS agreement, but with a few more exceptions.230 The European 
statute broadly provides that “patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
susceptible of industrial application.”231 No statute, however, is complete without 
a few exceptions, and Article 52 has several as well. One of these exceptions is that 
“methods for . . . doing business” and “programs for computers” shall not be 
regarded as patentable inventions.232 Although inventions of this type may seem to 
 
 
227. MOPOP, supra note 215, § 16.08.04.  
228. Id. 
229. E.g., James Leach, Patentability of Software and Business Method Inventions in Europe, 
MEWBURN ELLIS, https://mewburn.com/resource/patentability-of-business-method-and-software-
inventions-in-europe-2/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
230. See European Patent Office, European Patent Convention art. 52, ¶ 1 (June 2016); TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 198, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
231. European Patent Convention, supra note 230,  art. 52, ¶ 1. 
232. Id. art. 52, ¶ 2(c). 
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be explicitly barred, the exclusion does not apply to inventions that have a 
“technical character.”233 
Under EPO standards, software-related inventions may be grouped into one 
of two categories: programs for computers and computer-implemented 
inventions.234 The EPO distinguishes between these two categories by stating that 
a computer program refers “to a sequence of computer-executable instructions 
specifying a method,” whereas a computer-implemented invention refers to a 
“method being actually performed on [or by] a computer.”235 With respect to the 
stricter of these two categories, a computer program has a technical character, and 
therefore is not excluded from patentability, if the computer program produces a 
"further technical effect" when run on a computer, i.e., a technical effect “going 
beyond the ‘normal’ physical interactions between the program (software) and the 
computer (hardware) on which it is run.”236 On the other hand, patent claims 
directed to a computer-implemented method, including a computer-readable 
storage medium, cannot be objected to under Article 52 because any method 
involving the use of a computer or its specific hardware have technical character.237 
On the other hand, with respect to business method patents, the EPO 
Guidelines for Examination follow similarly to that of computer-implemented 
inventions.238 Like computer-implemented methods, the guidelines for examining 
a method of doing business provide that if the claimed subject-matter specifies 
technical means, such as computers, computer networks, or other programmable 
apparatus for executing at least some steps of a business method, it is not limited 
to excluded subject-matter as such, and thus not excluded from patentability under 
Article 52.239 In other words, the EPO pushes business method patents along to 
further analysis by examiners to determine novelty and non-obviousness so long as 
the claim specifies that the method is performed, at least in part, by a computer. 
iv. Recap of Foreign Patent Subject-Matter Eligibility 
As shown by the rules and guidelines in place in jurisdictions like Canada and 
the EU, it is clear that the United States’ approach to patent subject-matter 
eligibility is out of date and in need of reconsideration. The more consistent laws 
and guidance in place in Canada and the EU likely encourage inventors to file for 
patents and disclose their ideas. Compared to the United States, our current system 
 
 
233. European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Pt. G, Ch. 
II, §§ 3.5.3, 3.6 (Nov. 2018) [hereinafter GEEPO]. 
234. Id. Pt. G, Ch. II, § 3.6. 
235. Id.  
236. Id. In general, examples of further technical effects may include (1) “computer programs 
controlling the internal functioning or operation of a computer, such as processor load balancing or 
memory allocation;” (2) “[p]rograms for processing code at low level, such as builders or compilers;” or 
(3) a computer program corresponding to a method that itself has a technical character, such as a 
computer program for “controlling an anti-lock braking system in a car, determining emissions by an X-
ray device, compressing video, restoring a distorted digital image, or encrypting electronic 
communications.” Id. Pt. G, Ch. II, § 3.6.1. 
237. GEEPO, supra note 233, Pt. G, Ch. II, § 3.6. 
238. Compare id. § 3.5.3, with id. § 3.6. 
239. See GEEPO, supra note 233, Pt. G, Ch. II, § 3.5.3. 
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likely has more of a tendency to encourage trade secrets and thereby discourage 
investing money into research and development for software and business method 
innovations. 
So, why is it that the wealthiest, most technologically advanced country in the 
world—that is the home to worldwide tech giants like Apple, Amazon, Google, and 
Microsoft—refuses to provide direction as to what type of software and business 
method innovations should be eligible for patent protection? Moreover, why do 
both Canada and the EU have better guidance than the United States for 
determining the eligibility of computer-implemented inventions in general? But 
more importantly, who is going to fix this mess? 
VII. SUCH A CURIOUS DREAM: A PATENT SYSTEM PROPOSAL 
With the Federal Circuit’s hands tied by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
concerning patent subject-matter eligibility, the question becomes who, exactly, is 
in the better position to determine the patentability of software and business 
methods: Congress or the Supreme Court? Should the rule be in the form of a 
Congressional amendment, or should it be a Supreme Court holding? What should 
the rule be and how should it be formulated? We will explore these issues in this 
section.  
A. Congress Should Provide the Answer 
Although it was the Supreme Court that originally created the current 
problem, Congress is the ideal entity to clarify the patentability of software and 
business method inventions. This becomes apparent for at least four reasons: First, 
the Court has repeatedly declined to define bright-line rules for what is patentable; 
second, Congress would likely provide a more pro-patent resolution; third, a 
Congressional amendment would be longer lasting and more concrete than a 
Supreme Court holding; and fourth, the procedures for passing an amendment 
would provide an opportunity to receive feedback from businesses and inventors 
who are the ones investing their time and capital in research and development. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that this is the exact type of decision 
intended for Congress.240 In the words of Justice Scalia in his famous dissent in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,  
it is not of special importance to me what the law says about 
marriage. It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is 
 
 
240. E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) (“If these programs are to be patentable, 
considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of 
investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those 
operating in this field entertain.”);  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978) (“Difficult questions of policy 
concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and 
duration of such protection can [only] be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data 
not equally available to this tribunal.”). 
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that rules me. Today's decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 
320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine 
lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the 
furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can 
even imagine—of the Court's claimed power to create “liberties” 
that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention. 
This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected 
committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by 
extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most 
important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of 
Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to 
govern themselves.241 
Because Justice Scalia was not the only member of the Court who shared this 
similar belief,242 and since the Court’s current Justices likely do not feel experienced 
enough,243 let alone inclined to answer the question of patent subject-matter 
eligibility, the Supreme Court will likely continue to punt every time it is presented 
with the opportunity to draw the line for patentable subject-matter.244  
Additionally, a decision by Congress in the form of an amendment to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 would likely be more pro-patent and thus favorable to the issuance of 
software and business method patents in the future. A pro-patent legislative fix 
would further encourage innovation in the software and business method arts by 
encouraging inventors to disclose their inventions, rather than trying to maintain 
them in secret.  Furthermore, Supreme Court Justices, at least as compared to many 
of the Judges sitting on the Federal Circuit, have previously had tendencies to be 
anti-patent. For instance, once Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas allegedly stated 
that “a typical judge’s reaction to a patent is like that of a man suddenly 
 
 
241. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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sex couples.” Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Rather, the Chief Justice’s dissent was about 
“whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their 
elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to 
resolve legal disputes according to law.” Id. 
243. For instance, not one current Justice sitting on the Supreme Court holds an engineering 
degree, let alone a Bachelor of Science degree. See Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
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BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED 
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 4–5 (June 2019), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OED_GRB.pdf. 
244. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“We should not casually 
risk exceeding the constitutional limitation on Congress' behalf.”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2011) (“In consequence, we must hesitate before departing from 
established general legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems to suit the needs of one field 
produce unforeseen results in another. And we must recognize the role of Congress in crafting more 
finely tailored rules where necessary.”). 
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encountering a snake: His first instinct is to try to kill it.”245 Although this view may 
not be quite this drastic today, it potentially demonstrates the general proposition 
that patent law is a highly technical area of the law, and there is only a relatively 
small class of individuals who can understand both the intricacies of a patentable 
invention, as well as the patent laws applicable to that invention.  Therefore, the 
best legal doctrine for the patentability of software and business method inventions 
is likely going to be introduced by experts in the relevant field, not a Justice of the 
Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, a Congressional amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 101 would 
potentially be longer lasting and more concrete than judge-made law, thereby 
providing certainty in the patent law for years to come. If Congress were to amend 
§ 101, they would be able to define, in furtherance of the Constitution of course, 
exactly what inventions are patent-eligible. Additionally, the USPTO and the 
courts—including the Supreme Court—would be responsible for determining 
whether claims were patent eligible in light of a concrete definition instead of 
relying on a prior court’s holding in a factually distinct case.  
Finally, passing an amendment would provide more than just the law itself; it 
would provide floor debates, drafts, an opportunity for stakeholders to voice their 
opinions, and other important information to help interpret the intent of Congress 
in cases where the statute does not provide an explicit answer. Stakeholders and 
those investing their time, money, and expertise in research and development are 
the exact individuals that our patent laws were designed to incentivize. Thus, it 
makes sense to listen to the voices of the industry experts whom the patent laws 
primarily impact. 
At least for the foregoing reasons, I believe that the answer to this complex 
problem of patent subject-matter eligibility that the United States finds itself in the 
middle of lies with the Congress. It is Congress’s job under the Constitution to 
proscribe laws, and it is the Supreme Court’s job to interpret those laws in light of 
the Constitution. So how exactly should Congress respond? Let me tell you what I 
think. 
B. Author’s Proposed Amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 101 
As alluded to above in Section IV(C), I believe the “Restoring America’s 
Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018” (RALI Act) is, at least to date, the best 
proposed solution to the current patent subject-matter eligibility problem in the 
United States. Although I am somewhat in agreement with the RALI Act’s proposed 
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 101, I am not prepared to get on board with other 
sections of the RALI Act. For instance, I question the wisdom of repealing the first-
to-file system put in place by the America Invents Act (AIA).246 First, I believe the 
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first-to-file system creates a more straightforward, bright-line approach for courts 
and the USPTO to determine priority of patent applications under 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
Second, after making such substantial changes to § 102 in the AIA, I highly doubt 
that Congress is ready to do away with these changes after being in place for a mere 
seven years.247 Accordingly, I think such a drastic proposal in the RALI Act is 
potentially holding back a legitimate attempt to amend 35 U.S.C. § 101 that would 
otherwise be considered by Congress on a higher level of priority. 
Furthermore, although the RALI Act is a step in the right direction, I believe a 
better answer to the problem lies somewhere in between the RALI Act’s proposed 
amendment and the approaches already taken in Canada and the EU. Therefore, I 
propose that 35 U.S.C. § 101 be amended as follows: 
(a)  IN GENERAL—Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of 
this title. 
(b)  EXCEPTIONS—The following shall be regarded as 
excluded patent subject-matter under subsection (a), provided 
that a patent claiming excluded subject-matter as defined below 
in subsections (1)–(4) does not involve an inventive concept as 
defined in subsection (d): 
(1) discoveries pre-existing in nature; 
(2) scientific theories and mathematical relationships; 
(3)  pre-emptory principles in the abstract; 
(4) methods of doing business; and 
(5) software programs for computers. 
(c)  ELIGIBILITY STANDARD—The eligibility of a claimed 
invention under subsections (a) and (b) shall be determined 
without regard as to the requirements or conditions of §§ 102, 
103, and 112 of this title. 
(d) INVENTIVE CONCEPT—An invention claiming excluded 
subject-matter under subsection (b) recites an inventive concept 
and shall be considered patent-eligible under this section if, 
(1) for an invention claiming excluded subject-matter under 
subsection (b)(2), the claimed invention reduces the scientific 
theory or mathematical relationship into a specific and practical 
application. 
(2) for an invention claiming excluded subject-matter under 
subsection (b)(4), the method of doing business is implemented 
on a computer or similar device and, as a result of the 
implementation, the method of doing business realizes an 
improvement that was not otherwise capable of being achieved 
by a human. 
(3) for an invention claiming excluded subject-matter under 
subsection (b)(5), the software program:  
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(i) produces an improvement in computer-related 
technology; or  
(ii) corresponds to, or is incorporated into, an otherwise 
patent-eligible process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter under subsection (a). 
An amendment taking this form would, similar to the systems in place in 
Canada and the EU, strike down patent claims that merely act as a pre-emption to 
certain fields of innovation, while advancing patent claims tied to specific 
improvements or applications past the threshold of § 101 to determine whether 
the patent claims are in fact novel and nonobvious. I believe this amendment—or 
at least something similar—would maintain pace with current Supreme Court and 
Federal Circuit precedent, while providing a better platform to maintain 
consistency with the issuance of new patents. 
For example, while subsection (a) is just a restatement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in its 
current form, subsection (b) would codify the current judicial exceptions to 
patentability in addition to adding a few other per se exceptions that the Court has 
contemplated over the years. The first exception, discoveries pre-existing in nature, 
corresponds to the natural phenomenon exception, while the second exception, 
scientific theories and mathematical relationships, is meant to correspond to the 
laws of nature exception. Additionally, the third exception of pre-emptory 
principles in the abstract is meant to codify the abstract idea exception, but to bring 
the exception back to its roots as it was in Wyeth v. Stone where the patentee 
attempted to claim "an exclusive title to the art of cutting ice by means of any 
power, other than human power."248 Finally, the last two exceptions would codify 
the more recent problems the Court has been struggling with: methods of doing 
business and computer software. 
Additionally, subsection (c) would stay in line with the proposed language of 
the RALI Act.249 The reason this language is inserted is to maintain the separation 
between §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112, which should each have their own analysis 
comprising various questions.  Thus, § 101 would ask whether the invention claimed 
is of a type that is eligible for patenting, whereas §§ 102 and 103 would ask whether 
the invention is in fact new and not obvious, respectively. 
Subsection (d), however, is the real “meat” of the proposed statute. 
Essentially, this subsection provides the “exception to the exception.” Subsection 
(d) further refers to that exception as an “inventive concept,” thus keeping with the 
terminology used in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. We will review these 
exceptions one by one. 
First, subsection (d)(1) provides the exception for patent claims involving 
scientific theories and mathematical relationships, or in other words, laws of 
nature. This exception provides that a patent claiming a scientific theory or 
mathematical relationship may be patent-eligible if the claimed invention reduces 
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the scientific theory or mathematical relationship into a specific and practical 
application. Under this subsection, patent claims like those at issue in Diamond v. 
Diehr would be considered patent-eligible because the claims reduced the law of 
nature into a specific application of continuously monitoring the temperature inside 
of a rubber mold with a computer to determine a precise time to open the mold.250 
Second, subsection (d)(2) provides an exception for methods of doing 
business that are implemented on a computer or other device. Under this 
subsection, if the method of doing business realizes an improvement that was not 
otherwise capable of being achieved by a human as a result of the method being 
implemented on a computer, the patent claim recites eligible subject-matter. This 
provision maintains Federal Circuit precedent in cases like McRO, which generally 
held that patent claims directed to automating prior art techniques on a computer, 
which were previously capable of being performed only by a human, are patent 
eligible if they enable a computing device to perform—and improve upon—those 
prior art techniques.251 Additionally, this provision would have invalidated the 
claims at issue in Bilski v. Kappos because the patent claims in that case were merely 
directed to a method of doing business that was not tied to any computer or other 
device.252 With respect to Alice, however, this provision likely would have regarded 
the claims at issue to be patent-eligible. But this just means that the claims in Alice 
would have had a chance to be examined under §§ 102, 103, and 112; and assuming 
that intermediated settlement is truly a “fundamental economic practice” that is 
“long prevalent in our system of commerce,” the claims in Alice would have been 
invalidated under one of those provisions. 
And finally, under subsection (d)(3), an exception is provided for inventions 
claiming software programs that either (i) produce an improvement in computer-
related technology, or (ii) correspond to, or are implemented on, an otherwise 
patent-eligible process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter under 
subsection (a). Provision (i) would keep in line with the growing body of case law in 
the Federal Circuit that software inventions are patentable if they are directed to 
improvements in the way a computer operates.253 Additionally, provision (ii) would 
target the guidance in place in the EU that declares software as patentable subject-
matter when it is tied to a patent-eligible process, machine, or manufacture. In this 
way, the software that controls the behavior of a patent-eligible automated car or 
robotic machinery would also be patent-eligible. 
Although this model statute is not perfect, no statute defining patentable 
subject-matter ever will be. Questions will always arise in the course of 
interpretation of a statute. However, making an amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 101 
would be a step in the direction of stabilizing the United States patent system and 
hopefully improving the consistency of the issuance of patents.  
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VIII.  WHAT A WONDERFUL DREAM IT HAS BEEN: AN ENDING TO OUR JOURNEY 
Although I am in full agreement with the teachings of Abraham Lincoln that 
“[n]o organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to 
every question which may occur in practical administration,”254 the prevalence of 
post-Alice § 101 based rejections for patents claiming ineligible subject-matter is a 
sign that change is needed. The United States and other countries around the world 
are basking in the benefits of the Digital Revolution, and this revolution is far from 
over. Computer-related technology, including automation, networking, and cloud 
computing, is most likely going to continue developing and will reach levels never 
imaginable before. The days of taking a trip to the supermarket may soon be rare 
in our society. Thus, software and business method innovations are not going away. 
Rather, they are the future; and they may just be getting started. In light of this, 
considered action by Congress is needed to address the uncertainty created by the 
Supreme Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence. And Congress may ultimately be 
deciding not only the patentability of certain inventions, but also the future of 
American innovation as a whole.  
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